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provisions) in a variety of ecological, energy, and environmental domains 
which could include taxes for support. In addition, a single land tax which 
does not fuel real estate speculation and the inordinate development of a 
rentier society (Henry George) was also viewed as important for a more 
"just" society. 
• Currently, Sikkim, a state in India, primarily Buddhist, is 
considering a guaranteed annual income, and farmers in a province in 
south India are weighing a cash grant. 
• Andrew Yang, a current USA presidential candidate, has a 
campaign that centers around what he calls "UBI" (Universal Basic 
Income for all). In the context of explaining the philosophy on his website, 
he evokes the name of a certain "Founding Father": 
The idea of guaranteeing eve"' citizen an income from the government 
is an old one, first recorded during the Renaissance. In America, it was 
picked up by founding father Thomas Paine, who referred to the payments 
as a "natural inheritance. " If you are interested in reading about his ideas 
on UBI, a full rundown can be found here:  
https://www.yang2020.com/what-is-ubi/ 
Continued on page 7, Universal Basic Income 
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Raghavan N. lyer was a Fellow and Lecturer in Politics at St. Antony's 
College, Oxford University, from 1956 to 1964. He was a member of the 
staff of the Center from 1964 to 1966, when he assumed a full-time 
teaching post in Political Theory at the University of California at Santa 
Barbara. He remains with the Center as a Consultant. His book, The Glass 
Curtain, was published by Oxford University Press, which will also 
publish his exhaustive study of the political and social thought of Gandhi. 
The central assumption of this paper is the possible provision of a 
guaranteed annual income (or its equivalent in goods and services) to 
every American citizen in the abundant economy of the foreseeable future. 
The main purpose of the paper will be to indicate some of the drastic 
implications of this proposal for social theory and contemporary values, 





It is hardly surprising that the proposal to provide a guaranteed annual 
income (GAI) to all is seen by critics and champions alike as a 
revolutionary act in itself. If nothing else were done (which is 
inconceivable) , the enactment of such a proposal would alone be a 
primary factor in changing the way in which the social structure would 
give form and direction to the universal human urge for fulfillment. The 
unprecedented divorce between basic income and work, and between 
involuntary work and survival, will have repercussions on the level of 
income distribution, attitudes to work, social differentiation, social 
stratification, occupational ranking, the definition of success and failure, 
and the possibilities of fulfillment in an affluent society with an abundant 
economy, a mass consumer culture, and a federal system of representative 
democracy. All these repercussions – economic, social, political, and 
ethical – will be too uncertain and unpredictable, too chaotic and complex, 
to be adequately handled by any computer or master-planner or committee 
of social engineers. What is certain is that they will produce a change in 
the social structure so radical that it cannot come about without a 
transitional period of social disorganization and increased anomie. In other 
words, even if the eventual outcome is a Golden Age in which there is a 
new and stable social structure uniquely conducive to universal and 
unparalleled human fulfillment, it is diffi-cult to weigh the high cost in 
human suffering, waste, and frustration against the unearned gains to a 
future generation of inheritors of an unforeseeable (and therefore 
unintended) utopia. 
The fact that the GAI proposal does not make practical sense on its 
own merely illustrates an easily forgotten truth. The guarantee of income 
(or of material goods) cannot guarantee anything else that we may desire, 
but it draws attention to an array of possibilities that we tend to overlook in 
conventional appraisals of the available means in relation to elusive ends. 
The more we reflect calmly on the GAI proposal, the more we discern its 
dual impact on our minds. It is both a dynamite to mental inertia and a 
stimulus to our creative imagination. It heightens our awareness of 
dangerous trends and illusions already visible in this country, and it 
reminds us of the awesome prospect of the imminence of 1984 in some 
technocratic blueprints for the day after tomorrow. An automated economy 
could be an authoritarian nightmare if central control were to fall into the 
hands of power-hungry experts whose manipulative skills include the art 
of arousing emotion through the  deceptive rhetoric of freedom or welfare 
(conservative or radical), while catering to the insatiable demands of mass 




the thought of increasing coercion (or subtle pressure) in the use of pills 
and drugs to modify the genetic inheritance and emotional responses of 
human beings. 
The nightmare is frightening, but it must be dispelled. A technological 
utopia is indeed a denial of freedom if every man is made to carry out the 
function for which he is best qualified by order of an enlightened despot or 
a committee of benevolent experts. It may also be true, as Samuel Butler 
warned in Erewhon, that the mass of mankind will acquiesce in any 
arrangement that gives them better food and clothing at a cheaper rate. It is 
further obvious that even if the individual's lot matches his biological 
needs better after the "second industrial revolution" than after the first, this 
would not make the worker master of his job to any greater extent if there 
is no real change in the conditions in which jobs are created and 
distributed. The optimum use of individual capacities need not mitigate 
natural or social inequalities, it could easily sacrifice freedom to 
efficiency, and it might well augment "man's grovelling preference for his 
material over his spiritual interests." Above all, the masses who give 
power to clever technicians (the New Barbarians, as Shaw called them) are 
in real danger of finding themselves dominated by them because they need 
them. 
All these dangers are real – they are possible and even probable in a 
purely technological cornucopia. But the nightmare misleads us precisely 
in our feeling that we are helpless, that what is possible and probable is 
inevitable, that the technological utopia is historically determined and rules 
out any alternative vision of a feasible future. If we are frightened, what 
are we really afraid of – the machinations of a few men, the superhuman 
capacities of man-made machines, the mediocrity and conformity and 
materialism of the masses in an affluent society, or the lack of an adequate 
social philosophy or political wisdom in a representative democracy? Or, 
are we afraid only of ourselves? Are we convinced that there is nothing we 
can do about our fears? Do we despair of our capacity of exercising 
constructive imagination? Are we doubters of dreams and visions and 
believers only in nightmares? 
Mechanistic concepts are immensely tempting in an industrial society 
and they could be used to distort human consciousness. If all specifiable 
tasks for human beings can be reduced to routine movements which a 
machine can perform, engineers may lead us to the non sequitur that 
anything a man can do a machine can do. Computer experts may be able to 
use the techniques of formal logic, but they do not necessarily think more 




an elementary point in modal logic: that there is something they are not 
clever enough to do. (Either they can tie a knot that they cannot untie, or 
they cannot. Either way, there is something that they cannot do!) The 
technologist is neither a god nor a devil, nor even a man who is the sole 
purveyor of mechanistic concepts. As longas the control of the apparatus 
in modern industrial society (which limits consciousness) requires free  
agents, rational discourse cannot be wholly eliminated. 
If we can respond to the GAI proposal merely with negative rather 
than positive emotions, with nightmares to the exclusion of noble visions, 
we may be reluctant prisoners of a secular fatalism and a technological 
determinism that have theoretical as well as practical roots. The doctrine of 
inevitable, unilinear progress has enhanced our collective self-image 
(maintained by essentially nationalistic ideologies, conservative or radical) 
but flattened our individual ideals of self-fulfillment and narrowed our 
practical range of vision of human potentialities. There is always a logical 
gap between a descriptive account of the impact of technology on the 
social structure and an evaluative appraisal of either or both in terms of 
criteria of human fulfillment. This gap may be bridged in social theory and 
in human life by assuming in advance that we can know and predict 
contingent connections between changes in the human capacities. This is a 
plausible assumption and the mainspring of much that is admirable in the 
quest for collective self-improvement. But this assumption is dangerous 
when it is elevated into a dogma and may blind us to the lessons of 
contemporary history. The important thing is to judge every proposal for 
technical change or social improvement in terms of criteria of human 
fulfillment. 
Any social structure gives form and some continuity to the range of 
possibilities of human growth and fulfillment. Every social system can be 
appraised (though appraisals are not final and infallible judgments) in 
terms of human growth and fulfillment. A social structure can promote or 
retard or pervert human growth, according to internally shared or 
externally held criteria. It is also a contingent truth that remarkable 
individuals arise from time to time who transcend the limitations of their 
social situation and enrich our concept of human excellence. Democratic 
theory requires us to view any social structure in terms of the opportunities 
for growth for the many rather than the attainments of a few. It is 
majoritarian and also egalitarian (at least in a minimal sense). But there 
have been high cultures—high in the display of human excellence—which 
were unashamedly undemocratic. They tended to have stable and 




profit from the cultural attainments of the few. Modern democratic 
societies seek to appropriate the excellence of the hierarchical societies 
and rich cultures of antiquity. This attempt can never wholly succeed and 
sometimes vulgarizes borrowed standards and concepts of excellence. A 
culturally developed society shows contempt for a less mature society even 
if it is more democratic, egalitarian, and  affluent. The latter protects itself 
by caricaturing the former. 
Hierarchical social structures are justifiable only in relation to a 
consensus of belief regarding the structure of reality and of a constant 
human nature, and the mirroring of a transcendent structure in the social 
system. Their internal stability depends upon the effective maintenance of 
the consensus of beliefs and values and the reasonable relevance of role 
performance to ideal expectations. As this cannot be indefinitely 
maintained (though the longevity and attainments of some hierarchical 
societies is amazing), high cultures decay and their hierarchical social 
systems are ripe for revolution or radical reform if they are to survive. 
Egalitarian social structures can be justified not only in terms of equality 
but also in terms of freedom; they are more difficult to admire in terms of 
the criteria of human solidarity and of human excellence. They may make 
considerable advance on the basis of a seeming consensus of belief in 
current theories ("scientific" in different degrees and senses) regarding the 
structure of reality and of human nature. But their real strength lies in the 
extent to which an open view of human nature anddiverse world-views and 
dialogue between men of varied beliefs are maintained. This requires an 
appropriate social structure and political system. 
If we can decide on a hierarchy of needs and/or of values, an 
egalitarian social structure can be judged both in terms of common and 
minimal needs and of the spread of standards and the attainment of human 
excellence. However, if we agree to be more agnostic about human needs 
and human possibilities, if we regard human nature as always 
indeterminate (or our knowledge of its limits as inevitably inconclusive), 
we have a new criterion for appraising changes in the social structure in 
relation to the multiple criteria of human fulfillment. The changes in social 
structure that are envisaged in connection with the GAI proposal must be 
estimated not only in terms of these multiple criteria but also in relation to 
the actual pursuit of diverse ideals of human growth and excellence. The 
important thing about the idea of perfectibility is in the quest for it, its 
stimulus to indefinite growth. 
Society's judgments of success and failure are pretentious if they are 




vision of growth and fulfillment. The ideal of fraternity implies the 
capacity and need in individuals to identify with the achievements of other 
men and to show an uncondescending compassion for the weaknesses and 
failures of others. The meaning of education is the unfolding in individuals 
of the capacity to choose effectively, to set themselves the highest 
standards of excellence, to exemplify tolerance and civility in relation to 
others, to empathize with the achievements and failures of men 
everywhere, and to see life as a process of continuous self-education. 
A social system that is entirely based on the above considerations is 
truly utopian, but the justification of its ruling principles is no more 
difficult than of the ethical and social principles underlying the GAI 
proposal. The paradoxical and unpleasant corollary of all this may be that 
the very nation which is economically and technically capable of 
implementing the GAI proposal is culturally and ethically unprepared for a 
utopia based on similar principles. Can a conformist, success-oriented, 
competitive, culturally immature society deserve a sudden jump from 
mature capitalism to a technocratic and democratic utopia? Is this society 
of largely self-made men merely a distorting mirror of the repressed 
ambitions and muffled vulgarities of the world's proletariat? 
The problem may be put in this way. The wealthiest and most 
powerful nation in the world is the poorest in what was supremely precious 
to the highest cultures of classical antiquity and the renaissances of world 
history—the availability of time for thought and contemplation, for 
relaxation and creative (time-taking) work, for conversation and study, for 
love and friendship, for the enjoyment of the arts and the beauties of 
nature, for solitude and communion, for doubts and dreams, and for much 
else—for indolence and excellence, for salons and coffee-houses and the 
market-place, for laughter and tears, for poetry and philosophy, for song 
and dance and worship, for birds and beasts, for sleep and convalescence, 
for birth and death, time to live and enough time to dwell on eternity. Can 
the mere availability of more time teach the most time-saving society in 
history how to spend time and how to transcend it and how to appreciate 
timelessness? 
If the greatest souls from the largely forgotten cultures of antiquity 
were suddenly to descend upon the contemporary American scene, they 
would not, I think, grudge this country its golden opportunities for 
ushering in a better future for itself and for the world of mankind. They 
might freely concede that their own societies gave too much to too few and 
not nearly enough to too many. They might say that this country has 




numbers than any previous nation in recorded history. For this reason 
alone, this great republic deserves all its golden opportunities for truly 
enriching the lives of Americans and educating them in the varied ways of 
inspiring and serving the rest of mankind. But, in order to plan and prepare 
for the future, we must not shrink from calling things in the present by 
their proper names and learning all we can from the past. We must be deaf 
to the contemporary Voice of America at least for a while if we are to 
learn from the highest cultures of antiquity and listen to earlier voices in 
American history. We could especially benefit from Edward Bellamy, 
perhaps the boldest social prophet of the modern age, a latter-day child of 
the Enlightenment and student of ancient philosophies, a visionary whose 
chief work was a best-seller for decades and who is strangely neglected in 
his own country at the very time when he is most relevant. 
In his remarkable essay, written at 24, on "The Religion of Solidarity," 
in his unpublished manuscripts, and in several of his romantic stories, 
Edward Bellamy gave intuitive expression to a philosophy and psychology 
of man that are worthy of study. His understanding of human nature, of the 
burden of guilt and the connection between the quality of motive and the 
degree of fulfillment in human action, the tension between self-love and 
self-hatred, was profounder than that of the philosophes of the 
Enlightenment. His inversion of Calvinist theology and psychology 
enabled him to detach the moral appeal of Christianity from the Protestant 
ethic of capitalism. His view of man found place both for the vita 
contemplativa and for the vita activa, and he had a larger vision of human 
fulfillment than Marx and Freud. He understood what was overlooked by 
these titanic iconoclasts but was known to the noblest and humblest of 
men—the divine discontent, the urge for self-transcendence in human 
nature. Bellamy helps us to see the connection between "alienation" and 
"repression," a "restlessness" that lies behind and beyond the very real 
truths embodied in the concepts of "alienation" and "repression," that 
cannot be wholly reduced to either of these concepts. 
Looking Backward and Equality portray a daring vision of social 
transformation. Bellamy's conception of the society of the future was not 
based upon any single, supreme criterion of human fulfillment in relation 
to the social structure – social justice, equality, communal welfare, 
individual freedom, or even human solidarity. He was concerned with all 
of these and much more, because of his acceptance of the complexity, 
richness, and creativity of human nature, its capacity for self-expression as 
well as self-transcendence. He cared more for selfless romantic love and 




thinkers who have socialism or anarchism or communism in their brains, 
but only anger (however righteous) or resentment or meanness or pride or 
even self-hatred in their hearts. He combined the compassion of some of 
the English utopian socialists with the stress on a rational reorganization of 
society that characterized the French philosophes and also with the 
immense concern for individual freedom and human diversity of Constant 
and Mill. He was a prophet without anger, a thinker without disciples, a 
dreamer who was sane, a poetic philanthropist. He was American to the 
core—adventurous, somewhat plebeian, charmingly naive at times, an 
autodidact, forward-looking, a man who deeply cared about the practical 
realization of universal brotherhood. 
The fatal flaw of Bellamy's vision was his blurring of the distinction 
between reason, in the classical sense, and rationality as a principle of 
organization; hence, his heavy reliance on the machinery and bureaucracy 
of centralized authority, his emphasis on efficiency and formal regulation, 
his belief that ethical criteria provide rules of reasonableness that could be 
properly applied and justly enforced by institutions. He had a nineteenth 
century notion of public service and could not foresee the stark political 
irrationality of the twentieth century. 
Despite this central flaw of his detailed picture of social organization 
(which is the flaw of most social theories since Saint-Simon), Bellamy has 
a unique relevance to our attempt to envisage the American social 
structure of the future. There is an unresolved gap between his 
philosophical insights into human nature, emphasizing willing self-
transcendence as the key to self-actualization, and his sociological 
emphasis on external organization and formal regulation, on inducing 
cooperation in an industrial army, on the externalization of the hierarchical 
principle in a social system with economic equality and the ethic of 
solidarity. But we can still learn from his distinctive concern with the 
correspondence of the social structure (through the universal provision of 
opportunities) and the spread of new norms reflecting a concept of human 
nature that seeks external expression as well as inward fulfillment. He 
sought to strip the government of its glamour and reduce it to a service  
organization, to make the basic economic needs independent of 
competitive striving so that work can become creative rather than 
burdensome; emulation is directed toward non-material ends, and men find 
the inward freedom that reinforces social solidarity and also transcends it. 
His method was sound, moving from criteria of human fulfillment to social 





This is not the place for a detailed consideration of Bellamy. Suffice it 
to say that a revival of interest in his writings is overdue – his 
philosophical insights and his sociological illusions are alike suggestive. 
We are now ready to exercise our own imaginations in regard to the 
social structure of the future. I make bold to suggest a complete reversal, 
or radical modification, of several assumptions that we have hitherto taken 
for granted. This will give us some of the ruling principles—or rather what 
Coleridge called "saving principles"–in terms of which we could visualize 
and initiate the institutional changes that are needed. My concern in this 
paper is with the ruling principles rather than specific institutional 
changes. 
Frustration and fulfillment are relative terms. They are largely 
connected with the gap between expectations and their realization. An 
individual could decrease the gap either by lowering the level of his 
expectations or his standards of achievement, or both. He could endure the 
gap by evading it – by deluding himself as to the extent of his 
achievements or by becoming indifferent to past expectations or to present 
and future achievements. He could be humiliated or spurred on by the fact 
of the gap, by his estimate of it at any given time, and by the constancy or 
growth of the gap. All this depends upon his self-image, his own 
conception of himself in relation to others, his level of self-awareness, his 
concern with self-actualization, and his capacity for self-expression and 
self-transcendence, as well as his powers of self-correction, his spatial and 
temporal perspective. 
As society is the mirror in which a man sees himself, and as no man 
lives in a historical or social or cultural vacuum, the gap itself and the 
factors affecting it will all be affected by his social situation, his multiple 
roles, his occupation, his wealth and status, inherited, borrowed, and 
prevailing concepts of human nature, human excellence, of success and 
failure. The more he is affected by the factors within his power and 
determined by himself, the more of an individual a man is. The more 
varied, flexible, and changing a man's expectations and criteria of 
achievement, the richer he will be as a person, and the more capable of a 
variety of meaningful relationships with others. The more he is affected by 
external factors within his own society, the more he will be conditioned by 
it and the less capable of transcending it. The wider his vision of human 
excellence, the greater his access to other cultures in time and in space, the 
more universal a man he will be, the less conditioned by his own society, 
and, therefore, the more of an individual he is likely to become. But, in 




and judgments of his own society without becoming anti-social and even 
anti-human. Social judgments, when reasonably just, must be somewhat 
relevant to him if he is not to become a total heretic or hermit and risk the 
danger of becoming egocentric and losing touch with reality (social and 
human). The more he can modify social values, the more he can maintain 
and incarnate them, the more heroic or iconoclastic or conservative or 
exemplary will be his role as a member of his society. 
In a mature society (in which the proportion and importance of 
"individuals" is high and increasing) , a man will come to be judged more 
by the standards he sets himself (and others) than those external to him, 
though there must be some sort of optimal relation between his internal 
and external standards. Excellence in society is determined by a variety of 
factors, but it is both shaped by and exemplified in its heroes and saints, its 
philosophers, artists, and scientists, its craftsmen and innovators, its 
carriers of creative achievement as well as exemplars in the art of living. A 
society may be judged not only by its excellence but also by the 
opportunities it offers to all men to benefit from and emulate its 
excellence, the conditions of work it provides, the area and freedom of 
individual choice, the mitigation of social inequalities, the measure of 
social sympathy, the peaceful resolution of disagreements, the tolerance of 
diversity, the treatment of nonconformity in rebels, eccentrics, deviants, 
and delinquents, the impact of society's criteria of success and failure upon 
the strong and the weak, the restraints on its power-holders and the degree 
of participation of citizens in all policymaking, its reliance on persuasion 
rather than coercion, its stimulus to fulfillment, and its mitigation of the 
burden of frustration. 
Given this very broad perspective, what ruling principles should 
govern the social structure of the future in a republic that has enacted the 
guaranteed annual income proposal? 
First of all, we must re-examine the established tie-up between 
division of labor, multiple roles, social differentiation, and occupational 
ranking, distribution of income, property, and power, and social 
stratification, status-seeking, and social mobility. There are three sets of 
factors here (which I shall designate alpha, beta, and gamma) that 
determine the social structure through their interrelationship. The alpha 
factors are deeply embedded in the very notion of a complex society and 
are logically inseparable from the concept of an industrial society. The 
beta factors are institutionalized and self-sustaining (or self-perpetuating) 
unless modified by deliberate acts of policy and to some extent by private 




of the alpha and beta factors. The gamma factors introduce a shift from the 
empirical to the evaluative, although empirical indices could be found for 
them. They will always be dependent upon the internalization of social 
norms and upon individual valuation of these norms, as well as of their 
external signs and  practical consequences. There is no reason, in principle, 
why the beta factors should be seen as the necessary conditions for the 
maintenance of the alpha factors, still less as the sufficient conditions for 
the determination of the gamma factors. The alpha factors underline the 
fact of diversity in society, that individuals are different and do different 
things and contribute differently to society. The beta factors indicate the 
inequality of conditions and opportunities available to different 
individuals. The gamma factors result in a more or less rigid, stronger or 
weaker, form of the hierarchical principle rooted in human tendencies 
toward externalization. 
Durkheim, in his classic treatment of division of labor, pointed out 
that there exists in the mores of every society (conscience des sociétés) an 
imprecise notion of what the various social functions are worth, of the 
relative remuneration due each of them, and, consequently, the degree of 
comfort appropriate to the average worker in each occupation. The various 
functions are ranked by public opinion into a sort of hierarchy, and a 
certain coefficient of welfare is assigned to each according to the place it 
occupies in the hierarchy. There is, as a result, a very real set of rules that 
establishes the maximum standard of living each class of functionaries 
may legitimately seek to attain. The scale changes as the total social 
income grows or diminishes, and in accordance with the changes that 
occur in the mores of the society. 
Under the pressure of social norms, each person in his own orbit takes 
account in a general way of the extreme point to which his ambitions may 
go and aspires to nothing beyond it. If he respects the social ruling and 
submits to group authority, he is well "adjusted" to his station in life and a 
limit is thus marked out for his desires and wants. He may try to embellish 
or improve his life, but these attempts may fail without leaving him 
despondent. The equilibrium of his happiness is stable because it is 
determinate. However, it would not be sufficient that everyone accept as 
equitable the hierarchy of functions set up by the mores if he did not also 
consider equally equitable the manner in which the individuals who are to 
perform these functions are recruited. If each person began life with the 
same resources, if the competitive struggle is joined under conditions of 
equality, no one could consider the results of the struggle unjust. The 




will be. But this is only a question of degree as natural endowments may 
(or will) be unequal. 
Modern industrial societies have shown that the determination of the 
gamma factors by the beta factors is not as logical or as satisfactory (in 
terms of equality, equity, or coercion) as Durkheim suggested. The beta 
factors, so far from being merely a secondary consequence of social 
differentiation, have assumed a primary role in determining the gamma 
factors and have distorted the principle of human solidarity that is 
compatible with the alpha factors alone. We further tend to associate 
inequalities of social rank (a gamma factor) with people's occupational 
position (a beta factor) . It is this correlation which could be affected 
sufficiently by the GAI proposal (if several other things were done), so 
that the beta factors ceased to be the crucial link or intermediate agency 
between the alpha and the gamma fac- 
tors. Furthermore, among the beta factors, the importance of 
occupational ranking as the determinant (through the market value of the 
required qualifications) of the unequal distribution of income, prestige, and 
power could also be affected by GAI. 
By undermining the importance of the beta factors (through social 
policies accompanying GAI, especially in relation to conditions of 
voluntary work, attitudes to work, and the social norms engendered by 
education), a revolutionary change could result in the social structure of 
the future. This is especially because social stratification is always a rank 
order in terms of "prestige" and not of "esteem," a rank order of positions 
that cannot be thought of independently of their individual incumbents. It 
is social norms that mediate between individual attitudes (partly governed 
by sanctions) and the inequality of social positions, i.e., the degree of 
social stratification. The full implications of the reversal or modification of 
these current attitudes will only become evident when I have put forward 
the following ruling principles: 
The second reversal, or modification, of something we take for 
granted (in all societies, past and present) is just as revolutionary as the 
first, though it is less dependent on the GAI proposal as such. 
We have taken for granted that human life must be seen as a 
succession of stages, corresponding to somewhat arbitrary divisions of 
physical growth and decay, marked by exclusive concentration on distinct 
activities — education, productivity, and retirement. Education is seen as 
the preparation for a vocation, especially in an industrial society with 
increasing specialization. In an action-oriented and success-obsessed 




loneliness. The accent on youth makes the plight of the aged a generally 
intolerable and inhuman condition, made more pathetic by nostalgia and 
the pretense of rejuvenation. The emphasis on productivity, and its 
identification with economic activity or some tedious labor, distorts the 
very meaning of education. No wonder there is no meaningful use of 
leisure but, on the contrary, a dread of solitude, while the emphasis on 
gregariousness perverts the concept of play as well as of love and 
friendship. 
In place of the succession principle I recommend the principle of 
simultaneity of pursuit of education, work, leisure, during the whole of a 
man's life in the new society. With the introduction of GAI, work would 
become voluntary, training for and enjoyment of leisure a continuous 
activity linked with a philosophy of life-long education. There must, of 
course, be differences of emphasis in the kind of education or work or 
leisure activity, and there may also be some flexibility in regard to the 
proportions of these three modes of activity (though ideally they should 
merge into each other) in successive periods of human life. 
Paradoxically, I think that the simultaneity principle will better 
subserve one of Bellamy's philosophical insights than the succession 
principle, with which he combined it. The latter generates that false 
continuity through identification with the personal ego rather than the 
individualizing self which Bellamy was concerned to attack on 
epistemological and ethical grounds. Bellamy drew important social 
corollaries from his view that the individual is a composite of many 
persons, not one—the abandonment of the retributive theory of 
punishment (which is a welcome contemporary trend) and the danger of a 
man binding his future selves by pledges that he is in no position to take 
(this would be true of some pledges and not of others—a fruitful subject of 
inquiry) . 
Third, theories of society, and the structures implied or recommended 
by them, have tended to take for granted that there is in every man a fixed 
quantum of energy, a finite potential, which must be distributed 
economically in different directions, possibly according to some marginal 
principle of diminishing returns (in terms of tangible rewards or psychic 
satisfactions), or according to some specific theory of balance and 
integration. This principle dies hard. It is logically connected with a closed 
view of human nature, the notion of man as an unchanging essence 
governed by known and knowable laws. 
This view of the finitude, scarcity, and fixity of human energy and 




with an unalterably finite mind, is easily used to support the principle of 
specialization in economic and educational terms and rigid schemes of 
social differentiation. It makes more plausible the shift to social 
stratification and the need for a centralized authority responsible for a 
rational (i.e., efficient and equitable) allocation of functions. This theory, 
which is Aristotelian in origin and was reinforced by the sharp Judaeo-
Christian contrast between man and God and used by Hobbes to justify the 
subordination of the individual to the State, was explicitly stated by the 
physiologist Bichat and powerfully influenced the social thought of Saint-
Simon, and has been revived in the niggardly views of man of some 
contemporary psychologists. 
My open view of human nature requires me to reject this view of man 
as philosophically vulnerable; I think that its rejection in a society of 
abundance can also be justified on psychological, sociological, political, 
and even pragmatic grounds. It could become increasingly important in an 
automated society, which requires a continual redefinement of the concept 
of being human as opposed to a computer or machine. 
Bichat's physiological doctrine of inequality penetrated the social 
thought of the nineteenth century and became part of a general conception 
of man and society. He produced a trinary division into brain man, sensory 
man, and motor man, and his vitalist theory allowed for only a quantum of 
energy in each individual. In each type one dominant faculty was capable 
of great development, while the other two were destined to remain feeble, 
and no man, with the rarest of exceptions, could develop all three faculties 
to an equivalent degree. Physiologically, men were born limited and 
restricted and vital energy invariably tended to channel itself into one 
receptacle rather than the two others. 
This parsimonious, deterministic, and assured view of man has some 
plausibility; it is vaguely confirmed by common experience in that we do 
assume that human choice is needed between competing activities, that our 
time and energy is limited. But time means different things to different 
people and at different times; we have no reason to set advance limits to 
human creativity or to confine the term "energy" to a purely physical 
interpretation. William James in The Energies of Men emphasized that we 
all tend to use less than our potential energies, a point that is perhaps more 
meaningful to the American, with an energy that seems unbounded to the 
European. Even if we recognize that no man knows his potential amount 
of energy, however limited, or its quantitative measure in relation to all 
expended energies, we are entitled to base the structure of the future 




let alone arbitrary classifications of men and women into human types. 
The amount of energy in man is at least partly a function of its use, as is 
confirmed by learning theory. The brain surgeon, Wilder Penfield, has 
shown that it is just as easy for a child to learn three or even four 
languages as one, provided they are spoken and taught in appropriate 
circumstances. The importance of this entire question is considerable in 
the social structure of the future, in which one of the traditional drives 
behind the egalitarian principle will be weakened (by GAI) and in which 
elitist theories and the dominance of experts could do enormous harm. 
Fourthly, I recommend that a sacrosanct assumption in all social 
systems be questioned—that it is always possible to find a correlation 
between individual worth and any external criterion such as income, 
possessions, occupation, prestige, power, conformity to social norms or 
conventional morality. We might define a Golden Age as that in which 
there was a perfect fit between the external role and the expected qualities 
or virtues of men in society, when kings were really kings, scholars were 
really scholars, hierophants and priests and seers and warriors and traders 
and peasants and all others conformed to the ideal images of their roles. 
Such a society is unknown to history and belongs to mythology. We have 
lived, for better and worse, for millennia in the Age of Zeus, in which 
there is no necessary correlation between role performance and ideal 
images, in which there has been an enormous and increasing amount of 
role confusion. It is tempting to go to the opposite extreme and suggest 
that there is usually an inverse correlation between entitlement and 
possession of any position of power or responsibility, especially in the 
United States with its pervasive abuse of all names and its conformist 
nominalism. We might have to say that X is a scholar though he has a 
Ph.D., that Y is a statesman though he is President, and so on at all levels. 
This could make for so much cynicism that we would never come closer to 
social sympathy, let alone social solidarity. 
It is more important to hold that a mature society, like a mature man, 
will rely upon individual and freely given appreciation of due approval to 
individuals in different roles rather than upon superficial external signs. 
Externalization is related to conformity rather than to solidarity and 
inhibits the growth of individuality, as Durkheim saw. This modification 
of a generally held attitude could have several implications for the 
institutional set-up in the social structure of the future. The fewer formal 
requirements and external honors there are in such a society, the greater 
the chance of evolving an ethic of responsibility, a concept of intrinsic 




recognition by men of their peers and exemplars in a variety of 
subcultures. This also has a theoretical and practical implication for the 
emergence of a new type of non-official leadership, the encouragement of 
voluntary social and political schemes for reform, the devaluation of 
governmental authority, the gradual discrediting of coercive methods of 
regulation. 
Fifthly, we might consider the replacement of the simple, crudely 
competitive, and rather juvenile distinction between winners and losers by 
the idea that all men are givers and receivers in a variety of ways and 
contexts, that the quest for excellence is more important than rivalry in its 
achievement in some formal sense. Penalizing the winners and 
compensating the losers do not help to weaken the distinction between 
winners and losers. All rules are inevitably arbitrary, and at any rate they 
will be viewed differently by the winners and losers. A rule-bound society 
will accentuate inequalities, however much equality of opportunity is 
achieved. 
As involuntary work gives way to a new concept of work, the classical 
and conventional religious view of work as a burden could be replaced by 
the attitude of enjoyment and positive fulfillment in work that emerged in 
the Renaissance. This is connected with the diminution of the importance 
attached to competitive and comparative assessments, except in relation to 
a flexible and ever-enriched view of excellence. The distinction between 
the immature and the mature will not disappear in the society of the future, 
but it may be hoped that the latter will set the pace and increasingly hold 
the initiative, provided that the former do not crave positions of political 
power to compensate for their sense of inferiority. It will be difficult to 
safeguard against this danger without increasing the role of the psychiatrist 
to a point that could result in new dangers. 
Sixthly, I recommend the abandonment of the principle in all 
societies, especially in the era of modern nationalism, that an overarching 
national ideology is needed to maintain the social norms that provide 
stability and continuity to a social structure. The social structure of the 
future must incorporate within itself the principle of transcendence if a 
truly free society is to emerge. This change is perhaps the most difficult to 
envisage at present, when the United States is becoming increasingly 
nationalistic and aggressive in world affairs, provoking the rest of the 
world to agree at least on their increasing anti-Americanism. The change 
will have to come gradually, but it must come if the idea of a society of 
abundance is not to become intolerable in a world of misery. The 




ideology, will be countered by the strengthened foundations of a new 
society, a community of communities, a confederation of subcultures. The 
terms "American" and "American dream" could be redefined and recover 
the inspiration attached to their original meanings. The "American" would 
be a man of universal culture, as Whitman expressed it, a 
"compassionator" and "encloser of all continents" —the continent of 
Humanity. The "American dream" would refer to a vast social experiment 
and an example in practical brotherhood to all men and nations. 
Seventhly, I wish to add one more ruling principle, which I borrow 
from Ruth Benedict and Abraham Maslow, the principle of "synergy." (I 
commend the principle, not the name.) Ruth Benedict distinguished 
between "high" synergy and "low" synergy: 
"Is there any sociological condition which correlates with strong 
aggression and any that correlates with low aggression? . . . societies 
where non-aggression is conspicuous have social orders in which the 
individual by the same act and at the same time serves his own advantage 
and that of the group. .  
Non-aggression occurs [in these societies] not because people are 
unselfish and put social obligations above personal desires, but when 
social arrangements make these two identical. . . . I shall speak of cultures 
with low synergy where the social structure provides for acts which are 
mutually opposed and counteractive, and of cultures with high synergy 
where it provides for acts which are mutually reinforcing." 
Bellamy would have approved of this principle, but I am not wholly 
happy with the idea that the person who is selfish necessarily benefits 
other people (this smacks of an invisible hand, harmony of interests, and 
all that Keynes devastatingly attacked in The End of Laissez-Faire) and 
that virtue pays. The problem arises out of the notorious ambiguity of the 
notions of "interest," "self," and "self-interest." But the principle of 
synergy, needed by the weak in every society, has a profound corollary, 
stressed by Maslow: “. . . the secure, high synergy societies had .   a siphon 
system of wealth distribution whereas the insecure, low synergy cultures 
had . . . funnel mechanisms of wealth distribution. . . . Funnel mechanisms 
. . . are any social arrangement that guarantees that wealth attracts wealth, 
that to him that hath is given and from him that hath not is taken away, that 
poverty makes more poverty and wealth makes more wealth. In the secure, 
high synergy societies, on the contrary, wealth tends to get spread around, 
it gets siphoned off from the high places down to the low places. It tends, 




This could be the basis of imaginative programs of interchange of 
materials and personnel between the United States and the rest of the 
world, provided "rich" and "poor" are understood in non-material as well 
as material senses, and a new concept of voluntary limitation of wants 
among the maturer members of society emerges as a check against 
wasteful and conspicuous consumption. 
The social structure of the future could function on the basis of two 
sets of social norms, connected with two contrary conceptions of social 
and individual ethics. On the one hand, the authoritarian andsubjectivist 
and guilt-engendering theories of a non-naturalistic ethic could give way to 
a new naturalistic ethic which translates the "good" into the vocabulary of 
mental and psychophysical "health," a Paracelsian view of wholeness and 
a post-Freudian view of "maturity," as developed by the humanistic 
psychologists. This would enable us to view deviants and delinquents as 
candidates for compassionate therapy, while recognizing that even the 
most "mature" may need temporarily to go into retreats to sublimate, or to 
permissive places to work off, their own deviant tendencies. On the other 
hand, a supra-social or universally appealing ethic (in Bergson's sense) 
could evolve on the basis of the superogatory acts of courage and 
compassion of "heroic" and "saintly" individuals. In this ethic the "good" 
would be connected with a new concept of "honor" and "chivalry" and 
noblesse oblige, which could "shame" thoughtless individuals into an 
inward recognition of their neglected moral potentials. 
Given these ruling principles, how can we visualize the rules and 
institutions of the society of the future? How would all of them be fused 
into a single vision of the social system? 
I propose, for convenience, a distinction between private time, 
communal time, and civic18 time in the life of every citizen, corresponding 
to a similar division in regard to space (that would be the basis for 
ecological and urban-cum-rural planning), and a similar division in regard 
to education, work, and leisure. Civic time is what the citizen owes to the 
government in return for the GAI. Communal time will be divided 
between voluntary and creative work performed in voluntary professional 
associations, and leisure-time activities and discussions under thé auspices 
of voluntary clubs and societies of various sorts. Private time will be 
devoted entirely to contemplative and creative tasks performed in solitude 
or in small families. 
                                                          




There must be the maximum possible flexibility in the proportions of 
civic, communal, and private time at any point in the life of any citizen. 
Every person must contribute a minimal share of civic time duringthe early 
and middle periods of his life. Everyone must be encouraged to have some 
private time throughout his life and be offered a variety of incentives to 
give some communal time in the neighborhood as well as abroad. 
Educational facilities could be used during communal time, civic time 
wherever and whenever possible, and private time if desired. Those who 
wished to concentrate their energies, for a period, on civic or communal or 
private time must be allowed to do so, as far as possible. As a result, 
people will be free to augment their purchasing power (within broad limits 
determined partly by the supply and demand for goods and services, partly 
by the investment needs of the economy, and partly by the needs of foreign 
economies, as also by a ceiling to ensure social justice), their educational 
equipment, their chosen creative skills, their share of civic responsibilities, 
their leisure-time activities, their desire for privacy, their services to their 
families. 
All of this points to a degree of freedom and flexibility incompatible 
with the amount of control that we have come to regard as indispensable to 
social survival. But, in practice, our approximation to this model will 
depend upon the extent to which a substantial number of citizens balance 
their concern with individual claims to freedom against a willingness to 
consider the claim of the community upon them. 
Can even the organization of industry be dominated by the desire to 
serve, not the desire to be served? Psychologically, the desire to serve a 
community may be a late development, but the "instinct" to serve persons 
is as much rooted in the desire for self-expression as the instinct of self-
preservation. The impulse to serve persons, first displayed in the family, 
could develop into the desire to serve a community. But even if the desire 
to serve is strong enough to dominate self-seeking, several questions arise. 
Will the free service of those engaged in industry allow sufficient freedom 
of choice to those who need their services? Will a bureaucracy of 
industrial organizations rule us for our good but without regard to our own 
conceptions of what is good? Clearly, we must envisage some control of 
industry by the persons served, by composite authorities representing both 
consumers and producers. On the other hand, a special virtue of the model 
is its allowance of individual claims to development in activities not 
needed by other individuals or communities. 
The entire model rests upon the psychological assumption that as 




their recognition of the claims of other individuals and of communities as 
well as their concern with transcending themselves and also the claims of 
society. This assumption is indeed crucial to my vision of the social 
structure of the future. In practice, it requires an emphasis upon the 
continuance of the family in the future, possibly in an altered form 
anticipated by present trends. Why this connection between a 
psychological assumption and an institution traditionally regarded as 
natural but increasingly viewed as wholly social and dispensable? The 
answer is simple. The strength of the model of the future society lies in the 
extent to which the principle of voluntariness is enthroned. But, as a great 
deal depends upon whether this principle will generate the desire to serve 
the community (to a greater degree than in an acquisitive society of 
scarcity), the family acquires a new and important role. To call it a natural 
institution is to stress not only that it fulfills biological needs but also that a 
man does not choose his parents and relatives and that he has a 
psychological bond with his wife and children that is not wholly severed 
by a formal forfeiture of that bond. As a social institution, which need not 
be an iron cage, the family is an instrument of "socialization" that enables 
an individual to gain an awareness of other men, that helps him to choose 
his many voluntary relationships. This role acquires a new meaning when 
the economic function and the inescapable character of the family are 
undermined. But the continuance of the family will require that the 
distinction between the sexes (on the basis of child-bearing and child-
rearing, apart from other criteria) must be taken into account in the 
allocation of private, civic, and communal time, just as the difference 
between children and adults and other distinctions in terms of physical and 
social handicaps must also be considered. 
A crucial feature of the model is that communal time will be 
employed not only in creative work but also in informal associations. This 
is the immense opportunity afforded by the enormous increase in leisure 
consequent upon the enactment of GAI. The arts of friendship, 
participation in new forms of folk activities and play-activities, and of 
conversation and dialogue are the casualties of the present industrial 
society. They are the lost arts and they could be vital in the new society, 
giving it a richer way of life than is now known to Americans, helping to 
transform a seeming utopia into a high culture and a true civilization. The 
great ages of achievement in world history reflected a fortuitous clustering 
of creative individuals, a high degree of social and especially intellectual 
mobility, the confrontation and eventual fusion of diverse world-views and 




and transcending themes, the magical release of imagination from the ruts 
of conformity and effete tradition, the free flow of persons and ideas. The 
art of conversation requires that each member of a voluntary group is 
judged by his individual value and not as a member of a class or race or 
status group. As centers of extended conversation arise, the issues of 
deepest concern to men – the ultimate questions of life – can be explored 
with a degree of freedom that organizations with formal and partisan 
allegiances cannot allow — "academic" or "political" or "vocational" or 
"religious." 
In envisioning the social structure of the future, I have tentatively 
offered several fundamental ruling or saving principles and I have also 
suggested the merest hint of a possible "model." The principles raise 
numerous questions of theoretical and practical importance that need to be 
considered before concrete institutional possibilities could be elaborated. 
The broad, vague, and embryonic outlines of the future social system have 
been deliberately couched in abstract terms so that the "logic" of one 
possible model, embodying several unorthodox principles, could be 
intimated. Many gaps remain; many questions are unanswered and some 
are unanswerable. To the extent that the vision is utopian, it never has been 
and it never will be a concrete reality. To fail to see this is to be unaware 
of what is involved in the exercise of creative imagination. In the course of 
pursuing utopias, the dreams of men did not materialize, but something 
materialized that was the consequence of the dreams taking the form they 
did. It is only small-minded men who have imagined that the dreams and 
visions of men necessarily turn into nightmares. The consequences of 
utopias cannot be conclusively established for there is no way of knowing 
the gap in awareness between those who envisioned utopias and those who 
tried to translate them. Idle dreams are like those of Gonzalo in The 
Tempest— they merely reflect the goodness of heart, the childhood 
longings of the Gonzalos of this world, and may their tribe increase! 
Prophetic visions represent the triumph of hope over experience. They 
recognize the truth in the forgotten line of Miranda ("O brave new world/ 
That has such people in it") , and are nothing less than an act of faith in 
man, not in societies, still less in institutions. 
If the model hinted at in this paper is elaborated, the crucial question 
for predictive guesses will be the relation between the private, communal, 
and civic sectors. In terms of the premises (some unstated) underlying the 
model, the communal sector has the highest visible priority, the private 
sector is causally (and invisibly) the most important, and the civic sector 




incompatible with the ruling principles of the model to talk in terms of 
sectors except for convenience. But, in practice, the major problem of the 
new society, which must grow out of an unregenerate past, is likely to be 
in relation to the civic sector. If the future rulers of this society are even 
more unwise than the rulers of our time, this paper is a warning against the 
danger of subordinating the private and communal sectors to the civic 
sector while pretending to do the opposite. Present trends in this country 
suggest that the "deception" of the people, especially of the young and the 
downtrodden, will be more and more difficult in the future. Many of the 
institutions of this society have begun to suffer from the first symptoms of 
a process of creeping paralysis. There is a loss of stimulus and failure of 
response; a kind of arteriosclerosis has set in, and, more and more, 
energetic minds must turn elsewhere for sustenance and inspiration. It is 
increasingly difficult to fool more and more people most of the time. If the 
future rulers of this society are no more unwise than at present, they will 
see the need for a new balance between the private, communal, and civic 
sectors. But if this society is fortunate to find future rulers wiser than any 
before, they will allow the civic sector less and less priority than the 
communal and private sectors while appearing to do the opposite or, better 
still, to do nothing. 
This is a presumptuous offering and the inquisitive might wish to 
know more about its unstated premises. The answer to such was given by 
Goethe's Faust: 
 
Who may dare 
To name things by their real names? The few 
Who did know something, and were weak enough 
To expose their hearts unguarded—to expose 
Their views and feelings to the eyes of men, 
They have been nailed to crosses—thrown to flames. 
 
This need apply only to the unstatable premises. Several of them were 
articulated a long time ago, and are shrouded in the myths and mists of 
antiquity, notably in Plato's account in Protagoras. In their concern for the 
preservation of the species of human beings, the gods charged Prometheus 
and Epimetheus with the task of equipping them and allotting suitable 
powers to each. Epimetheus begged Prometheus to allow him to do the 
distribution himself, and he acted on a principle of compensation, being 
careful by various devices that no species should be destroyed. Epimetheus 




stole from Hephaestus and Athena the gift of skill in the arts, together with 
fire, for without fire it was impossible for anyone to possess or use this 
skill in the arts. With these stolen gifts men could survive, but had no 
political wisdom. Prometheus, therefore, gave to man Hephaestus' art of 
working with fire, and the art of Athena as well. But as men still lacked the 
political wisdom to live in communities without injuring one another, Zeus 
sent Hermes. He imparted to men the qualities of respect for others and a 
sense of justice,  so as to bring order into our cities and create a bond of 
friendship and union. The gifts of Hermes were distributed to all men and 
not only to a few, as in the arts. What Protagoras omitted to mention was 
the greatest of all gifts – only it was not given and it could not be stolen, it 
had to be won by secret striving – the gift of Orpheus. If, with Epimethean 
hindsight and Promethean foresight, we could prepare for the society of 
the future, a society in which the gifts of Hephaestus, Athena, and Hermes 
are wisely used, Orpheus may well appear again on earth. 
 
DISCUSSION 
McDonald: My major critical question of Mr. lyer goes to his 
optimism. He is persuaded not that man will in fact triumph over the 
machine, over manipulation and depersonalized organization, but that he is 
not helpless, that he has the power to triumph. Abstracted from the 
concrete human condition, man does possess the power to control his life, 
but taken in his present human condition he finds it difficult if not 
impossible to summon the requisite reformist vision and will. I believe Mr. 
lyer must do more than assert the hope. He says, "As long as the control of 
the apparatus in modern industrial society requires free agents, rational 
discourse cannot be wholly eliminated." This is narrow ground indeed on 
which a stand can be made for optimism, or at least against pessimism. 
I'm also inclined to question his statement that "In envisaging a new 
social structure, we may think  of progress only as the continuous 
extension of the area of opportunity for decision and experiment and 
fulfillment." An added criterion of progress is actual human achievement 
of fulfillment. But that would be a test of the person, not of society. Social 
progress does, in fact, consist in the enlargement of human opportunity; if 
it goes beyond that, it constitutes a threat to human freedom. 
Mr. lyer expresses the hope that in the future society a "new concept 
of voluntary limitation of wants among the maturer members of society" 
will emerge as a "check against wasteful and conspicuous consumption." 
There is no question that voluntary human action is preferable on all 




which individuals refuse to do voluntarily for the common good? Is the 
reliance on voluntary virtuous actions based on anything more substantial 
than desire? Mr. lyer seems to suggest that the emergence of "heroic" and 
"saintly" individuals performing "superogatory acts of courage and 
compassion" may give us a "universally appealing ethic" in which the 
"good" would be connected with a new concept of "honor" and "chivalry" 
and noblesse oblige, and that this could shame "thoughtless individuals 
into an inward recognition of their neglected moral potentials." Certainly 
the example of men like Schweitzer, Gandhi, Pope John XXIII, justifies 
confidence in the ability of good men to radiate goodness. But the fact that 
as astute and perceptive a man as Mr. lyer must pin his hopes, apparently, 
on the random appearance of saintly men is an indication, I believe, of the 
magnitude of the difficulty in creating a social structure that will fulfill 
rather than crush the human spirit in the years ahead. 
Weisskopf: Mr. lyer's paper is structured around a triad of antinomies: 
the antinomy between a hierarchical society, on the one hand, and the 
flexible society, on the other hand; the antinomy between the vita 
contemplativa and the vita activa; and, third, the antinomy between the 
social role (or the social function) and self-fulfillment. Although I may be 
accused of seeing Helen in every woman, like Faust, I seem to find in 
these antinomies the idea of balance that I have proposed. Practically 
everything points to balance between them. For instance, the hierarchical 
society and the flexible, democratic, mobile, egalitarian society are both 
extremes; the society of the future – the utopian society – may have to 
combine the two systems. As for the antinomy between the social function, 
or role, and the idea of fulfillment, I think that, on the whole, modern 
sociological and sociopsychological theory has made too much of the split 
between the individual and society. The split stems from the old libertarian 
ideology, the laissez-faire ideology, where the individual rebelled against 
medieval restrictions. Today we know that it is very difficult to distinguish 
what are we and what is society. The conflict is more internal, more within 
us, than between us and society. The rules and commands of society 
become part of us so that we come to feel that we want what society wants 
us to want. There is no society, future or past, that can really avoid this 
conflict, because every society will provide an outlet for certain human 
inclinations, aspirations, orientations, and traits, and will repress, suppress, 
and alienate the individual from others. The problem is only this: In what 
direction should we work to change our institutional system so that it 
permits a manifestation of certain now repressed and alienated traits? Here 




repressed at the expense of the vita activa, especially in science, 
technology, and industry. 
Let me deal briefly with Mr. lyer's discussion of what I have called 
ontological scarcity. In this connection Mr. lyer refers primarily to the 
restrictive interpretation of ontological scarcity that he finds in Durkheim 
and in Bichat—that human energy is limited and thus justifies and requires 
specialization. We have moved away from this idea. We know today that 
fulfillment consists in more than specialization; it consists in getting out of 
the groove into which society has put us. To me this does not completely 
nullify the idea of ontological scarcity. The basic Aristotelian distinction 
remains valid: Man is a being who is aware of potentialities. This is 
perhaps the most important characteristic, but there are also imagination, 
thought, memory; man can transcend his existing, given situation, as the 
plant and the animal cannot, although at the same time he is bound by his 
physical, psychological, and social traditions to a restricted, limited 
actuality. The clearest evidence of this is the limitation of our lives and the 
limitation of our energy, not in the sense that we could not learn much 
more than we do, not that we couldn't have a wider horizon than we have, 
but that there is an end to it somewhere. This ontological situation will 
always present us with the economic problem of allocating our limited 
time and our great, but still limited, energy. 
It is of great importance to recognize that there is a continuous 
changing relationship between what people think they are, and what they 
think their roles are. There have been societies and social structures in 
which the two have coincided closely, though never completely. In the 
high cultures – the high middle ages, the great Mandarin period of China, 
the great era of India – they probably overlapped verymuch. Today what a 
person thinks he is and what his social role is move further and further 
apart, and the tension between the two becomes greater. This cannot be 
avoided, and I don't think it should be avoided, because this gap is really 
the chief motivation in the dynamics of history, and itself leads to change 
and, if one may use the word, to progress. 
Allen: I have several questions. Mr. lyer, you reject the static view of 
energy and contemplate that there may be the prospect of man's infinite 
growth and development. Are you suggesting something similar to what 
Bellamy suggests, that is, an increase in the spiritual powers of man? I'm, 
of course, aware that you're not suggesting that a child can learn not three, 
but thirty, languages—there does come a limit. But are you indicating the 




You speak about the danger of the domination of the civic element in 
the new society over the communal and the private. How is this going to 
be prevented? You say it will depend on the wisdom of the rulers of the 
future. But must it not be prevented by some shaping of the institutional 
means, by focusing on the democratic process and enhancing it, by 
enlarging the number of those who will participate in the decisions of 
government? What are the means to assure us there won't be the 
domination of the civic? 
You suggest that there will not be the same hierarchical arrangements 
in the utopian society. But won't there still be different segments in the 
new society—those who are equipped to understand the science, the 
technology, and those who are not so equipped but who will simply 
participate in the private and communal segments of the society? If this 
will be the fact, won't there inevitably be social status as a consequence of 
this and a continuing hierarchy? lyer: I would say simply that my paper 
reflects my possibly excessive belief in the therapeutic effect of awareness. 
I think that when one sees a problem clearly, sees certain things for what 
they are, their hold over us is less. People are beginning to see through a 
lot of things; their trouble is that they don't know whom to blame. And if 
they don't know whom to blame, then, of course, they're confused and 
have no clear vision of what they can do. This is why vision is so very 
important. There may even be differences in social status, but they need 
not be incorporated into a rigid hierarchy, if the differences are seen 
merely as the by-product of human diversity. And, in relation to your 
question about the civic sector, I strongly reaffirm that the whole paper 
would be nonsense if this was left only to the rulers. It is really up to 
people who, thinking along these lines, will take the initiative away from 
the State, and not merely influence State decisions. The whole concept of 
nonofficial leadership is crucial. Even today it's amazing how much 
freedom one has in our society if one really tries to do something. 
American society could benefit from a characteristic of the English 
people: a good-humored contempt of politicians and bureaucrats. How do 
we get these people to take themselves less seriously? I think, by behaving 
toward them as if they are not what they think they are. This is implicit in 
a dialogue with people in power. It also means a growth of unofficial 
activity. There will always be the danger of a ruler who will use his power 
to do the things we fear, but to watch out for this is a function of social 
opinion; in short, people get the government they deserve. 
Dyckman: Let's suppose that the disenfranchised— the Negro civil 




inherited the central city and defeated the rationalization of civic politics. 
And suppose they sought to create a democratic utopia along the lines of 
their present perspectives. I think they might produce a medieval city; in 
other words, a democratic — along limited lines — kind of utopia, but not 
a technocratic utopia. I say this because the thrust of these critics has been 
anti-technocratic. They are antagonistic to the whole system of 
rationalization that technology goes through. They object to the human 
cost and the casualties in the efficiency processes. They also object to the 
indirectness of these processes; they object to the ethic of postponed 
gratification, if you like. They object to the assignment of roles that lead to 
depersonalization. They object to the appetite that technological systems 
have for normalizing. They object to the premium placed on other-
directedness,but they also object to the excessive rewards for inner-
directedness. 
In view of all this, how would we advise critics of the system to 
organize the citizens for the tasks in the city of the future? What would 
replace the efficiency systems, and on what would they be based? What 
new norms would be developed? How much hierarchical ordering would 
be necessary? 
lyer: I'll just say two things. One is the question of people in this kind 
of model who want to opt out totally. To me, the idea is very attractive that 
every society should permit individuals to be outlaws, vagrants, tramps, 
peripatetic persons, and yet it is a fact that this happens less and less in 
human history. It was accepted in old cultures. In England, for example, 
the tramps were ignored by the police until a few years ago, even though 
there were rules against them. There will always be such people, and more 
tolerance must be shown to them. If they become a nuisance, they should 
be given some kind of territory. But the more important case concerns not 
tramps and vagrants but the ones we think of as genuine radicals. They are 
very few. Generally they care more about changing society than about 
themselves. What can they do to make civic work attractive? This is one of 
the crucial questions in the model. My feeling, on the whole, is, let civic 
work be disagreeable. Let the people who really can't do anything else, 
those conventional people who always need to rely on the big machine, let 
them become the bureaucrats, let them run the machine. The people who 
enjoy doing this sort of thing are the people who really can't do very much 
else. This is tolerable provided that outside the civic sector the really 
important things go on, the things that ought to concern radicals. One of 
the important matters outside the civic sector – and this is, I think, your 




of craft activities, various kinds of even complicated industrial activities. 
The problem, of course, is how to organize this kind of industry in a 
socially satisfactory manner. Can we envisage a non-hierarchical 
organization of large-scale industries? Delisle Burns thought we can. Scott 
Bader has experimented in this direction. It is a matter for careful study. I 
haven't gone into this, but it must be done. Davis: The retreat from politics 
that we are experiencing today mirrors our own impotence. It mirrors a 
situation in society where people are increasingly free to act but where, 
increasingly, their acts are separated from any consequence or effect. It 
also mirrors their isolation from the apparatus of decision-making. One of 
the most interesting questions of our day is how the technological 
revolution might expand the possibility of human freedom, the possibility 
of greater participation in politics that might transform the nature of 
politics itself. 
The Athenian polis is frequently used as a prism, as a mirror. It was 
the first learning society, the first one in which contemplation became a 
virtual mode of life. On the other hand, it was also the first politically 
participating society. The Greeks felt that freedom consisted in being freed 
of having to work for your subsistence. Freedom was participation in 
society; it was man becoming historical; it was involving himself. It was 
making decisions and molding them as a man. Even when Mr. lyer was 
posing the antagonism between the civic and the communal spirit, he was 
proposing a solution, and that is the extent to which the civic can become 
communal. He suggested one basis for this – the notion of 
decentralization. Politics based upon voluntary association, which I 
assume to be something similar to the grass-roots organizations that are the 
prime political motif of the civil rights movement, could create a whole 
new form of politics. People retreat from politics because it is no longer 
effective. Perhaps through some new merger of the communal and civic 
we might again see politics as the whole spirit of man's control over his 
environment, over his society, although there would always be a provision 
for opting out. 
The final implications have to do with education. Donald Michael's 
report to the Center on cybernation19 poses some thoroughly horrific views 
of the future: the gradual exclusion of people from information because the 
information has grown too complex and too technical for them to handle; 
the creation of new elites. Under these circumstances the right sort of 
education should not deal with the technical content or with specialization 
                                                          




but with the restoration of the media, the restoration of public access to 
information. Education would concern itself with the use of the premises 
of science and a knowledge of the alternatives. One of the implications of 
the technological revolution is that for the first time society has 
alternatives open to it. For instance, by abolishing labor, it might be 
possible to return to crafts. If alternatives and options like this are going to 
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The world has become much richer and more productive, but it has 
not become more stable and happy. At the same time, technologies 
designed to improve our lives are actively evolving, and sufferings, 
diseases, wars and crisis are growing exponentially. 
The lack of effectiveness of attempts to solve this problem, based on 
purely economic, political and social perspectives, demonstrates the need 
to find solutions in the field of worldview issues. 
Why are we coming into this world? The answer to this question 
raises another question. Who are we and what is our mission in the living 
space of the planet and the Universe? As we are biological creatures that 
occupy the appropriate link in the natural world, our goal is to sustain our 
existence and continue in the next generation. That is, to restore oneself. 
So do plants or animals. Their species have been unchanged for centuries 
and millennia. But they consume just enough to sustain their existence. 
They do not eat excessively, and do not destroy other species of animals, 
almost if they are predators. The instinct of self-preservation and 
procreation (the two basic instincts that are inherent in man) urge animals 
to direct their lives to seek and consume food. So matter exists, by virtue 
of its imperfection, as a form due to empirical conditions, it constantly 
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